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2087 
The Other Janus and the Future of 
Labor’s Capital 
David H. Webber* 
Two forms of labor’s capital—union funds and public pension funds—
have profoundly reshaped the corporate world. They have successfully 
advocated for shareholder empowerment initiatives like proxy access, 
declassified boards, majority voting, say on pay, private fund registration, and 
the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. They have also served as lead plaintiffs in forty 
percent of federal securities fraud and Delaware deal class actions. Today, 
much-discussed reforms like revised shareholder proposal rules and mandatory 
arbitration threaten two of the main channels by which these shareholders have 
exercised power. But labor’s capital faces its greatest, even existential, threats 
from outside corporate law. This Essay addresses one of those threats: the direct 
and indirect challenges posed to labor’s capital by the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 
Council 31. These threats may have spillover effects in the corporate arena. This 
Essay discusses these developments in light of Randall Thomas’s early and 
prescient work on labor as a shareholder.  
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INTRODUCTION 
When corporate lawyers and scholars discuss “the Janus case,” 
they usually mean Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, a 
2011 U.S. Supreme Court opinion that limited who could be sued for 
making false statements in violation of Rule 10b-5.1 But another Janus, 
a labor case, may have greater implications for the corporate world than 
its more familiar namesake.2 In the 2017 decision Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, the 
Court overturned more than forty years of precedent to strike down 
“fair share fees” on First Amendment grounds.3 “Fair share fees,” or 
“agency fees,” were required fees public employees paid to public-sector 
unions to compensate the unions for the benefits they secured for 
workers via collective bargaining.4 Long-standing precedent held that 
workers could not be forced to join public-sector unions, or to support 
union political activities, but they could be required to pay “fair share 
fees.”5 Under collective bargaining rules, unions were required to 
represent all workers in a unionized workplace, even those who chose 
not to join them.6 In the absence of fair share fees, the requirement that 
unions represent all workers could have led to worker free riding, one 
of the express rationales for upholding such fees under long-standing 
Supreme Court precedent in 1977’s Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education.7  
Forty years later, Mark Janus brought suit to directly challenge 
Abood after Justice Alito invited such a challenge in Harris v. Quinn, 
 
 1. 564 U.S. 135, 141 (2011); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019) (“It shall be unlawful for any 
person . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security.”). 
 2. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) 
(holding that “fair share fees” violate the free speech rights of nonunion members).  
 3. Id. at 2460, 2486 (overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).  
 4. Id. at 2461–66; id. at 2489 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that “agency fees [are] now 
often called fair-share fees”).  
 5. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 (approving nonunion members’ argument that “they may 
constitutionally prevent the Union’s spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to 
political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining 
representative”).  
 6. Right to Fair Representation, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-
protect/whats-law/employees/i-am-represented-union/right-fair-representation (last visited Nov. 
8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7TWM-FLGC] (“Your union has the duty to represent all employees – 
whether members of the union or not – fairly, in good faith, and without discrimination.”).  
 7. Abood, 431 U.S. at 221–24.  
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asking whether it was time to revisit that holding.8 Janus was a child-
support specialist who worked for the Illinois Department of Healthcare 
and Family Services.9 He was not a member of the local American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”) 
union that represented him and workers like him in negotiating wages, 
benefits, and workplace conditions with the State of Illinois.10 He 
objected to the forty-five-dollar-per-month “fair share fee” he was 
required to pay to the AFSCME local to compensate it for negotiating 
on his behalf, arguing that the fee violated his First Amendment 
rights.11 Janus characterized union negotiations with the government 
over salaries, pensions and benefits as speech.12 The Supreme Court 
agreed.13 Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Alito stated: “In simple 
terms, the First Amendment does not permit the government to compel 
a person to pay for another party’s speech just because the government 
thinks that the speech furthers the interests of the person who does not 
want to pay.”14 Mark Janus’s negative-value legal claim was financed 
by the Liberty Justice Center (part of the conservative think tank 
Illinois Policy Institute) and funded by organizations like Donors Trust, 
the Charles Koch Institute, and the Ed Uihlein Family Foundation.15  
The Janus holding has both direct and indirect implications for 
labor as a shareholder. The direct implication is that the reasoning in 
Janus might apply directly to public pension funds themselves. Just as 
public-sector workers were once required to pay fair share fees, so they 
are required to contribute to public pension plans.16 Could the reasoning 
in Janus apply to these plans? In an era in which environmental, social, 
and governance investing has risen to prominence, at what point do a 
public pension’s investment choices implicate the First Amendment, 
 
 8. See 573 U.S. 616, 635 (2014) (“The Abood Court’s analysis is questionable on several 
grounds. Some of these were noted or apparent at or before the time of the decision, but several 
have become more evident and troubling in the years since then.”).  
 9. Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Strikes down Public-Sector Union Fees, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2018, 12:14 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-
court-strikes-down-public-sector-union-fees/ [https://perma.cc/6VUV-U5XE].  
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2461–62 
(2018). 
 13. Id. at 2486.  
 14. Id. at 2467.  
 15. Celine McNicholas, Zane Mokhiber & Marni von Wilpert, Janus and Fair Share Fees: The 
Organizations Financing the Attack on Unions’ Ability to Represent Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1, 
9 (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/142063.pdf [perma.cc/8QJ9-UMMC]. 
 16. NASRA Issue Brief: Employee Contributions to Public Pension Plans, NAT’L ASS’N ST. 
RETIREMENT ADMINS. 1 (Sept. 2019), https://www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20Briefs/ 
NASRAContribBrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/JEW7-FBAY] (discussing the mandatory nature of 
public pension fund payments).   
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thereby mandating opt-out rights to dissenters?17 And if so, will Janus 
hasten the demise of the traditional defined-benefit pension in favor of 
the 401(k), following the path taken in the private sector decades ago?18 
Even if the Janus holding does not directly apply to the 
financing and structure of public pension funds—and there are good 
reasons to believe it does not—the case is likely to have indirect effects 
on labor’s shareholder activism.19 To the extent that the Janus holding 
reduces funding for public-sector unions, those unions will have fewer 
resources to deploy for shareholder activism and to defend public 
pensions from the unrelenting legal and political attacks they face from 
the same forces that financed Janus.20  
Finally, I will discuss these new threats to labor’s capital in light 
of Randall Thomas’s early and prescient work on the subject more than 
twenty years ago. Thomas coauthored, with Stewart Schwab, the first 
empirical work on labor’s shareholder activism, Realigning Corporate 
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, published in the 
Michigan Law Review in February 1998.21 That piece noted the tension 
such funds might face in navigating their interests as both workers and 
shareholders.22 And it made several predictions, including that “the 
alignment of union and other shareholders will have profound effects 
on both corporate governance and long-term union goals”23 and “[i]f 
unions can package the results of their research in proposals that 
emphasize to shareholders the ways in which the two groups’ interests 
are aligned, then union-shareholder activism could be here to stay.”24 
 
 17. See Keyur Patel, ESG Investing Moves to the Mainstream, 74 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 39, 39 
(2018) (“The number of companies worldwide that report environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) data has grown exponentially over recent years, from fewer than 20 in the early 1990s to 
almost 9,000 in 2016.”). 
 18. See Alicia H. Munnell & Anqi Chen, 401(k)/IRA Holdings in 2016: An Update from the 
SCF, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. B.C. 2 (Oct. 2017), https://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/IB_17-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R29-NCUN].  
 19. See, e.g., Da Lin, Janus and Public Pension Funds, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/janus-and-public-pension-funds/ [https://perma.cc/J6DR-AJ3E] 
(discussing the differences between public pension funds and agency fees and questioning whether 
the Janus majority would apply its reasoning to public pension funds).  
 20. See McNicholas, Mokhiber & von Wilpert, supra note 15, at 8–12 (examining the 
organizations funding fair share fee litigation and noting that without these fees unions will be 
forced to operate with fewer resources).  
 21. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998) (investigating the 
consequences of new shareholder activism by unions).  
 22. Id. at 1020.  
 23. Id. at 1023.  
 24. Id. at 1025.  
Webber_PAGE 11/16/2019  7:09 PM 
2019] THE FUTURE OF LABOR’S CAPITAL 2091 
These predictions hold up after twenty-one years.25 Hopefully, this 
discussion of Janus will help inform our view of whether they will 
continue to hold in the coming decades. 
I. THE POTENTIAL DIRECT EFFECTS OF JANUS ON LABOR’S CAPITAL 
The first threat posed by Janus to labor’s capital is a direct one: 
the argument that struck down fair share fees as violating the First 
Amendment could potentially be applied to public pension funds, which 
also receive mandatory contributions from public-sector workers.26 To 
what extent might public pension fund shareholder activism constitute 
coercive speech, and where might courts draw the line? In a separate 
writing project, I will offer a comprehensive analysis of the First 
Amendment implications of mandatory pension contributions by state 
and local government employees. Here, I will highlight some of the main 
arguments on both sides.  
A. The Debate Over Whether Pension Contributions Are Coercive 
Even before Janus was decided, some commentators argued that 
workers should be able to opt out of mandatory pension contributions 
on First Amendment grounds.27 In Shareholder Activism by Public 
Pension Funds and the Rights of Dissenting Employees Under the First 
Amendment, Eric Finseth characterized environmental, social, and 
governance (“ESG”) investing as political or ideological rather than 
commercial speech.28 By engaging in ESG investing, Finseth argued, 
pensions depart from the economic goals that are supposed to be 
paramount, triggering heightened First Amendment concerns.29 As 
such, public pensions must create opt-out rights for contributing 
workers.30 There are multiple responses to Finseth’s argument. First, 
ESG investing is not a departure from, but an enhancement of, 
 
 25. See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST 
WEAPON (2018) (discussing the effects of labor’s shareholder activism over the years and detailing 
the legal and political challenges this activism faces).  
 26. NASRA Issue Brief: Employee Contributions to Public Pension Plans, supra note 16, at 1 
(discussing the mandatory nature of public pension fund payments).  
 27. See, e.g., Eric John Finseth, Shareholder Activism by Public Pension Funds and the Rights 
of Dissenting Employees Under the First Amendment, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 293 (2011) 
(arguing that dissenting employees have a First Amendment right to object to their portion of 
shares being used to advance political or ideological goals).  
 28. Id. at 349–62.  
 29. Id. at 366.  
 30. Id. at 294.  
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economic criteria.31 ESG advocates have argued that taking such 
factors into account represents an investment decision because, for 
example, global warming poses investment risks for a broad range of 
companies, including, most prominently, energy and insurance 
companies.32 There is some (contested) empirical evidence that ESG 
investing has outperformed traditional investment portfolios.33 Second, 
pension fund fiduciary duties bar trustees from investing for purely 
political reasons.34 Still, it is true that pensions have, on occasion, taken 
explicitly political criteria into account in making investments.35 The 
classic example was divestment from South African companies over 
Apartheid, in which many states adopted legislation changing their 
plans to require divestment.36 Widespread revulsion against Apartheid, 
 
 31. See, e.g., Investment Governance and the Integration of Environmental, Social and 
Governance Factors, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 30 (2017), 
https://www.oecd.org/finance/Investment-Governance-Integration-ESG-Factors.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F676-HYF5] (“[I]t is increasingly argued that integrating ESG factors – 
especially climate change factors – can help institutional investors avoid significant shocks to their 
portfolios related to physical and transition risks.”).  
 32. Id.; see, e.g., Meaghan Kilroy, Environmental, Social Issues Big in Proxy Season, 
PENSIONS & INV. (July 9, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/ 
20180709/PRINT/180709889/environmental-social-issues-big-in-proxy-season [https://perma.cc/ 
DC4L-GA8D] (noting that environmental and social concerns accounted for over half of 
shareholder proposals submitted at U.S. companies in 2018); Mike Scott, Insurers Will Be Hard-
Hit by Climate Change but They’re Not Investing in the Low-Carbon Economy, FORBES (May 31, 
2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikescott/2018/05/31/insurers-in-the-front-line-of-
the-fight-against-climate-change-shoot-themselves-in-the-foot/#4cb1b6db40fa [https://perma.cc/ 
4WSS-KAHQ] (discussing the significant losses facing insurers as climate change hurts the 
companies they invest in).  
 33. See Gunnar Friede, Timo Busch & Alexander Bassen, ESG and Financial Performance: 
Aggregated Evidence from More than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 210, 
212 (2015) (“[W]e find that the business case for ESG investing is empirically well founded.”). 
Contra Frank J. Fabozzi, K.C. Ma & Becky J. Oliphant, Sin Stock Returns, 35 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 
82, 84 (2008) (“The financial performance that underlies social responsibility has generated an 
obvious interest on the part of investors, but the empirical evidence that supports investment 
performance is far from conclusive.”); Christophe Revelli & Jean-Laurent Viviani, Financial 
Performance of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI): What Have We Learned? A Meta-Analysis, 24 
BUS. ETHICS 158, 158 (2015) (“[G]lobally, there is no real cost or benefit to investing in SRI.”). 
 34. JOHN J. CANARY, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. NO. 2018-01, 
INTERPRETIVE BULLETINS 2016-01 AND 2015-01 (Apr. 23, 2018) 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-
bulletins/2018-01 [https://perma.cc/E6CE-WDYM] (“The Department has a . . . longstanding 
position that . . . fiduciaries may not sacrifice investment returns or assume greater investment 
risks as a means of promoting collateral social policy goals.”).  
 35. See Richard M. Ennis & Roberta L. Parkhill, South African Divestment: Social 
Responsibility or Fiduciary Folly?, 42 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 30, 30–33 (1986) (discussing investment 
and divestment strategies directed at influencing the political situation in South Africa).  
 36. See Sandy Boyer, Divesting from Apartheid: A Summary of State and Municipal 
Legislative Action on South Africa, AM. COMMITTEE ON AFR. (Mar. 1983), 
http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-130-CB5-84-al.sff.document.acoa000587.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9KH8-DNC3] (cataloging state and local legislation on divesting from South 
African companies and apartheid).   
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legislation protecting pension fiduciaries from claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty over Apartheid divestment, and the lack of legal 
challenges to fiduciaries over such divestment created precedents of 
uncertain value when it comes to adopting explicitly political criteria.37 
Even widespread scientific consensus over global warming has not 
translated into U.S. pension fiduciaries directly divesting from carbon-
producing companies on political grounds alone.38 Such choices are still 
largely rooted in debates about the business risk of investing in 
unsustainable businesses.39 (In contrast, some European funds have 
divested on political grounds alone, such as when Norway’s 
Government Pension Fund divested from oil and gas.40 However, even 
these divestments can be considered business focused because Norway 
is massively exposed to the oil and gas business as an oil-producing 
country.41 The Pension Fund is itself funded by the Norwegian 
government from oil revenues including taxes and licenses for oil 
exploration, and is therefore already significantly exposed to the oil and 
gas business.42) To the extent that investing or divesting on 
environmental grounds may be characterized as a political and not an 
investment choice—as Finseth seems to describe it—must states 
provide an opt-out right for individual employees in such 
circumstances, given the coercive nature of pension contributions? 
Yet another First Amendment concern was raised by Jennifer 
Mueller.43 Mueller argued in a Slate article, How the Janus Ruling 
Might Doom Public Pensions Next, that if a public employee “cannot be 
required to ‘subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public 
 
 37. See Ennis & Parkhill, supra note 35, at 35–36. 
 38. See Umair Irfran, The World’s Richest Institutions Invest in Fossil Fuels. Activists are 
Changing That., VOX (May 15, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/5/13/18282438/fossil-fuel-
divestment-climate-finance [https://perma.cc/LR5V-Z24N]. 
 39. See, e.g., Stanley Reed, Norway Moves to Sell Some Oil and Gas Shares From Wealth 
Fund, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/business/norway-fund-oil-
gas.html [https://perma.cc/6RHG-BY92] (discussing the Norwegian wealth fund’s sale of oil and 
natural gas holdings). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (“The Norwegian finance minister, Siv Jensen, said on Friday that the government 
aimed to ‘reduce the vulnerability of our common wealth to a permanent oil price decline.’ ”). 
 42.  See id. (“The fund . . . was created with revenue from the country’s oil and gas operations 
and is invested in securities and real estate outside Norway with the intention of providing for an 
aging population and for when oil revenues begin to decline.”); see also Government Pension Fund 
Act, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT. (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.nbim.no/en/organisation/governance-
model/government-pension-fund-act/ [https://perma.cc/NJ2Z-7QH8] (establishing that the Pension 
Fund is funded in part by “the net cash flow from petroleum activities,” which includes revenue 
from certain taxes, dividends, and royalities).  
 43. Jennifer Mueller, How the Janus Ruling Might Doom Public Pensions Next, SLATE (July 
18, 2018, 4:17 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/07/how-the-janus-ruling-might-doom-
public-pensions-next.html [https://perma.cc/X9W9-YHGK]. 
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concern,’ as Justice Alito wrote in Janus, why does this protection stop 
with his union fee? Why does it not also extend to his pension?”44 She 
amplified these arguments in a law review article, The Paycheck 
Problem.45 To the extent that corporations themselves engage in 
political activity, workers are arguably forced to subsidize such activity 
through their mandatory contributions to pension funds that, in turn, 
invest in said corporations.46 These companies regularly lobby the 
government on matters of public concern.47 For example, 
pharmaceutical companies lobby the government over Medicaid 
reimbursement levels.48 Can this kind of lobbying be analogized to 
lobbying the government over public employee wages and benefits, 
which the Janus majority characterized as speech? This concern raised 
by Mueller goes even further than the argument made by Finseth, 
which applied only to ESG investing.49 It could potentially sweep almost 
all investment into the realm of the First Amendment.  
In contrast, Da Lin has argued that public pension investing 
differs in a fundamental respect from collective bargaining by labor 
unions, and therefore Janus might not apply.50 She pointed out that the 
Janus majority “stressed that fees supporting ‘collective bargaining in 
the private sector’ do not raise the same free speech problems as fees 
supporting ‘collective bargaining with a government employer.’ ”51 Lin 
notes that “[t]his is because ‘[i]n the public sector, core issues such as 
wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues, but that is 
generally not so in the private sector.’ ”52 Janus only struck down 
public-sector agency fees and, in so doing, placed significant weight on 
the public-private sector distinction.53 That seems to suggest that the 
court would leave private-sector union agency fees alone. In one post-
Janus case, a federal district court declined to apply the holding to a 
 
 44. Id.   
 45. Jennifer Mueller, The Paycheck Problem, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561 (2018) (examining 
the tensions in the Supreme Court’s recent First Amendment jurisprudence and suggesting a new 
limiting principle to advance the operational purpose of the First Amendment).  
 46. Id. at 566.  
 47. Id. at 567, 605.  
 48. Id. at 604.  
 49. Finseth, supra note 27, at 293.  
 50. See Lin, supra note 19 (distinguishing public pensions from unions on the basis that 
public pensions invest in private-sector companies, rather than in government entities).  
 51. Id. (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2480 (2018)).  
 52. Id. (quoting Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2480).  
 53. See 138 S. Ct. at 2480 (criticizing Abood for failing to “take into account the difference 
between the effects of agency fees in public- and private-sector collective bargaining”); id. at 2486 
(concluding that “[s]tates and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from 
nonconsenting employees.”). 
Webber_PAGE 11/16/2019  7:09 PM 
2019] THE FUTURE OF LABOR’S CAPITAL 2095 
private-sector union.54 Lin further characterized public pension 
“speech” as focusing on the internal governance of investees or the fees 
charged by investment managers, “private matters that affect neither 
government budgets nor important public policies.”55 By an extension 
of this reasoning, Mueller’s argument is at best an indirect one.56 Public 
pension investment in companies and shareholder activism at such 
companies are interventions in the private sphere. 
Thus, one question at the heart of the doctrinal dispute between 
Finseth, Mueller, and Lin is whether public pension investment activity 
constitutes forced speech of the sort that would run afoul of the Court’s 
holding in Janus.57 Rather than parse out that argument here, I will 
instead assume for the sake of argument that public pension fund 
investment does indeed implicate the First Amendment concerns raised 
in Janus. What effects would that have on public pensions and their 
investment behaviors? Briefly, it could require the funds to create opt-
out rights, thereby putting even more pressure on funds to convert to a 
401(k) model.58 It could also lead to reductions in ESG activity, if any 
such ruling were to strongly suggest that such considerations deviated 
from value-maximizing activity. But it could additionally lead to minor 
structural changes that would have negligible effect. The devil is in the 
details, but some options are sketched out below.  
B. Structural Direct Effects 
One potential workaround for the speech problem would be a 
system of direct employer payments, as Da Lin and Ben Sachs have 
 
 54. See Carter v. Transp. Workers Union of Am. Local 556, 353 F. Supp. 3d 556, 576 (N.D. 
Tex. 2019) (“[T]he ruling in Janus applies to public-sector unions and workers, not private-sector 
unions and workers. . . . It remains to be seen if the Supreme Court’s ruling in Janus will be 
extended to private-sector unions; however, this is not the issue before the Court in the instant 
case.”).  
 55. Lin, supra note 19. 
 56. See Mueller, supra note 45, at 566–67, 605 (arguing that at a fundamental level, private 
pensions are not dissimilar to public ones). 
 57. See Finseth, supra note 27, at 293 (arguing that “dissenting public sector employees have 
a right to opt out of having their pro rata portion of shares of publicly traded corporations held by 
public pension funds voted with respect to political or ideological matters in a manner with which 
the dissenting employees disagree”); Lin, supra note 19 (arguing that although “mandatory 
employee pension contributions are [likely] unconstitutional under Janus’s framework,” other 
viable funding options exist); Mueller, supra note 45, at 567 (arguing that it is difficult “to identify 
constitutionally meaningful grounds to distinguish pension contributions from agency fees for the 
purposes of a compelled speech analysis”). 
 58. See, e.g., Finseth, supra note 27, at 294, 366 (arguing that employees have these rights 
under the First Amendment).  
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argued.59 Rather than force workers to pay into the pension system via 
a paycheck deduction, employers could make a direct payment on behalf 
of workers to the pension. If the pension dollars are directly contributed 
by the employer on the worker’s behalf, rather than by the worker 
herself, the First Amendment implications may be eliminated.60 Thus, 
states and cities interested in largely preserving the current defined 
benefit could move to collectively managed pension funds, and these 
could largely continue operating as usual. 
A second option would be the creation of opt-out rights. Public 
employees could opt out of the pension if they so desire.61 The question 
is, what would they opt into? One possible answer is the 401(k). As I 
have argued in my book, The Rise of the Working Class Shareholder: 
Labor’s Last Best Weapon, the greatest threat to labor’s capital and 
labor’s shareholder activism is the 401(k).62 There is a concerted effort 
by many of the same entities that financed Janus to undermine public 
pension funds by “smashing and scattering” them into millions of 
individually managed 401(k)s that are then farmed out to mutual 
funds.63 The success of that campaign will likely doom labor’s 
shareholder activism, bringing to an end a significant chapter in the 
history of corporate governance.64 That is because the necessary 
precondition for labor to exercise shareholder power is for it to have 
separately managed pools of assets like those that currently exist in 
public pension funds.65 Mutual funds have shown an increasing 
willingness to be active, but they will never fill the void of public 
pensions, for structural business reasons that I have discussed in depth 
elsewhere.66 Elimination of pensions and widespread conversion to the 
401(k) is not unthinkable—it is exactly what has happened in the 
private sector, and a well-funded campaign to bring about the same 
conversion in the public sector is already underway, as detailed in The 
 
 59. See Lin, supra note 19 (discussing the use of direct employer payments in the public 
pension fund context); Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 1046, 1073–74 (2018) (discussing the use of direct employer payments in the union context). 
 60. Lin, supra note 19. 
 61. See Finseth, supra note 27, at 294, 366 (arguing that employees have these rights under 
the First Amendment).  
 62. WEBBER, supra note 25, at 213–21. 
 63. David Webber, The Real Reason the Investor Class Hates Pensions, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/opinion/investor-class-pensions.html [https:// 
perma.cc/F9XR-7G8Z]. 
 64. See WEBBER, supra note 25, at 213, 218–20 (discussing the practical difficulties of 
sustaining meaningful shareholder activism with a 401(k) plan, as opposed to a centralized, 
defined-benefit plan). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 220. 
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Rise of the Working Class Shareholder.67 The result in Janus will only 
aid that campaign.68 
Still, to the extent workers could retain the option to remain in 
traditional public pension funds, there are good reasons to believe that 
the majority of them would do so. First, as Lin, Sachs, and others have 
argued, there is no free-rider problem in the public pension context 
because workers do not get pension benefits if they fail to pay into the 
system.69 This contrasts with nonunionized workers who may still 
benefit from wages, benefits, and working conditions negotiated by 
public-sector unions. The absence of a free-rider problem reduces the 
incentive to drop participation, since costs are not unfairly imposed on 
some workers to the benefit of all.70 Thus, the main reason to opt out of 
a public pension would be if the pension’s ESG investing so offended a 
worker that she preferred to opt out. Here, the cultural messaging 
around public pension funds might play a role in that worker’s opt-out 
decision. 
For decades, critics of public-sector unions have argued that they 
are bad for workers.71 According to that argument, these unions collect 
fees from workers that benefit the unions themselves and their 
leadership at the expense of the rank and file.72 The movement to 
deprive public-sector workers of the right to unionize has long been 
called “right to work,” conveying the message that unions inhibit 
worker freedom and workers’ ability to earn a living.73 Thus, once 
legally liberated from the requirement of paying union dues, workers 
could keep more of their paychecks and rid themselves of useless, “job-
killing” unions.74 As discussed below, that has not happened yet, but 
antiunion organizations remain confident that it will. 
In contrast, critics of public pensions have made almost the 
opposite argument. In such messaging, the victim of public pension 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 238–40. 
 69. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 19 (contrasting public pensions with labor unions, with respect 
to the free-rider problem).  
 70. See id. (discussing why “a voluntary payment mechanism is more viable in the pension 
setting” than in the union setting). 
 71. See, e.g., David Harsanyi, Public-Sector Unions Deserve to Be Destroyed, REASON (Mar. 2, 
2018, 12:30 AM), https://reason.com/2018/03/02/public-sector-unions-deserve-to-be-destr 
[https://perma.cc/74ZT-R9F8] (highlighting the coercive nature of public-sector unions). 
 72. See id. (comparing the mechanics of public-sector unions to racketeering). 
 73. See Right to Work Frequently-Asked Questions, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. 
FOUND., https://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Nov. 8, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/HEL6-R5MZ]. 
 74. See Harsanyi, supra note 71 (challenging the notion that unions are helpful for workers—
for example, through alleged benefits of collective bargaining negotiations). 
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funds is not workers but taxpayers.75 According to this view, public 
employee pensions are so exorbitant, so rich and unaffordable, that they 
must be pared back or they will harm taxpayers.76 For example, 
Americans for Prosperity, financed by the Koch brothers, ran a 
“Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous on A Government Pension” 
campaign in California, in which it hired a chauffeur to drive a white 
stretch limousine around the state to draw attention to what retirement 
was supposedly like for California state employees.77 Whatever effect 
that message had on taxpayers, it would seem unlikely to discourage 
workers from participating in such pensions. If anything, it might have 
increased their gratitude for them. 
Thus, in deciding whether to drop union membership, a worker 
might have strong cultural and economic reasons for doing so. But in 
dropping participation in a public pension fund, there is little or no 
economic reason to do so, and in fact, that worker may well think of that 
decision as one requiring her to give up a large benefit in exchange for 
greater ideological purity. She might still make that choice. Public 
pensions might be smaller without such dissenting participants, and 
that would correspondingly decrease their shareholder power, but it 
would not unfairly impose costs on some workers for the benefit of 
others, thereby incentivizing all workers to drop out. 
II. THE POTENTIAL INDIRECT EFFECTS OF JANUS ON LABOR’S CAPITAL  
Even if Janus does not apply directly to public pensions, the 
indirect effects may be large. To the extent Janus harms public-sector 
unions, public pensions may be harmed too. It could reduce the funds 
available for activism or reduce the funds available to defend public 
pensions from attacks on their very existence. 
 Janus was financed by the Liberty Justice Center and the 
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.78 Their express 
 
 75. See Monique Morrissey, Understanding Cuts to Public Pensions, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1, 1 
(June 9, 2014), https://www.epi.org/files/2014/understanding-cuts-to-public-pensions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B9Q8-B279] (noting “fears that underfunded public pensions are a growing 
burden on taxpayers”). 
 76. See id. 
 77. WEBBER, supra note 25, at 221; Americans for Prosperity California (@AFPCalifornia), 
Pension Reform Tour, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/AFPCalifornia/ 
photos/?tab=album&album_id=10150128290552318 (last updated Oct. 13, 2013) 
[https://perma.cc/JA99-MKNY]. 
 78. See McNicholas, Mokhiber & von Wilpert, supra note 15, at 7–9 (using IRS Form 990 
filings to determine that both nonprofits represented the plaintiffs in Janus); Spencer Sunshine, 
Meet the Money Backing Mark Janus and His Case v. AFSCME, UNIONIST (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://unionist.com/blogs/news/meet-the-money-backing-mark-janus-and-his-case-v-afscme 
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purpose in bringing the lawsuit was to undermine public-sector 
unions.79 The theory was that if Janus struck down fair share fees, 
funding for public-sector unions would collapse, an argument the 
unions themselves seemed to embrace.80 In anticipation of the Janus 
ruling, major unions cut their budgets significantly.81 The capital 
strategies groups of major unions were not spared these across-the-
board cuts. For example, the Service Employees International Union 
(“SEIU”) merged its Capital Stewardship Program and its Research and 
Policy Programs into a new Strategic Initiatives Department designed 
to fulfill both functions.82 Long considered the gold standard for labor’s 
shareholder activism, the SEIU’s Capital Stewardship Program was a 
prime mover, for example, in the California Public Employees 
Retirement System’s decision to divest from hedge funds, a four-billion-
dollar divestment that sent a shockwave through the industry.83 True, 
not all unions cut back as the SEIU did, but the anticipated net effect 
of Janus cut union resources in ways that at least indirectly impacted 
the corporate sphere. Unions reoriented scarce resources towards 
remarketing themselves to their own members to keep them from 
dropping the union or ceasing to pay their fair share fees in anticipation 
of an adverse ruling in Janus.84 
 
[https://perma.cc/V7LH-WZQ5] (stating that Mark Janus was represented by counsel from both 
nonprofits). 
 79. See McNicholas, Mokhiber & von Wilpert, supra note 15, at 9 (describing how the Janus 
plaintiffs argued “that public-sector unions should not be able to cover the cost of representing and 
negotiating on behalf of nonmembers who benefit from the union’s representation”). 
 80. See id. at 2 (“Because unions are legally required to represent all employees in a 
bargaining unit, not just union members, fair share fees are crucial . . . . [E]liminating fair share 
fees defunds unions and goes a long way toward stripping workers of their ability to organize and 
bargain collectively.”). 
 81. See Noam Scheiber, Supreme Court Labor Decision Wasn’t Just a Loss for Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/business/economy/unions-funding-
political.html [https://perma.cc/4S9L-FWQE] (“Mary Kay Henry, the president of the Service 
Employees International Union, said that her union had cut its budget by about 30 percent in 
anticipation of the decision . . . .”); Mike Antonucci, Exclusive: Ahead of a Key Supreme Court 
Decision, America’s Largest Teachers Union Slashes Budget by $50 Million, Projects That 300,000 
Members May Leave, 74 MILLION (May 21, 2018), https://www.the74million.org/article/exclusive-
largest-union-to-slash-budget-by-50-million-in-advance-of-supreme-court-decision-300000-
members-will-leave-within-2-years-leaders-predict/ [https://perma.cc/GR5J-M7TE]) (reporting 
that the National Education Association planned to cut its budget by fifty million dollars, an 
estimated thirteen percent reduction).  
82. The Author received this information in an off-the-record email from an individual with 
knowledge of the restructuring.  
 83. WEBBER, supra note 25, at 101–03; Mary Williams Walsh & Alexandra Stevenson, With 
Pension Fund Giant Calpers Quitting Hedge Funds, Other Investors Reflect, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Sept. 16, 2014, 9:31 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/with-calpers-
quitting-hedge-funds-other-investors-reflect/ [https://perma.cc/SBS2-H3FG]. 
 84. See Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, How Unions Are Already Gearing Up for a 
Supreme Court Loss, GOVERNING (Oct. 5, 2017, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-janus-afscme-right-to-work-states-unions.html 
Webber_PAGE 11/16/2019  7:09 PM 
2100 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:6:2087 
From the perspective of the unions, the short-term reaction to 
Janus has been a best-case scenario. So far, there has been almost no 
drop in union membership nationwide, and there is some evidence that 
union membership has actually grown slightly.85 For example, 
Pennsylvania, Oregon, California, and Chicago have all reported slight 
increases in union membership since Janus.86 Some have attributed 
that relative success to the unions’ remarketing campaigns.87 Others 
point to public-sector unions’ still-formidable ability to flex their 
political muscles in certain states, some of which have adopted 
legislation designed to dampen the negative effects of Janus.88 For 
example, New Jersey adopted legislation that narrowed the time frame 
within which workers must decide to leave their unions,89 and New 
York adopted legislation to ban disclosure of public employee contact 
information that could enable antiunion groups to contact public 
employees and encourage them to stop paying their fees.90 California, 
Washington, and New Jersey “now prohibit public employers from 
discouraging union membership.”91 Still others attribute this short-
term, post-Janus success to high-profile teacher strikes and the 
increasing popularity of unions in a time of growing concern about 
economic inequality and unequal bargaining power.92 
 
[https://perma.cc/N3KA-5PNZ] (noting unions’ efforts to convince employees of the benefits of 
union membership, and to reiterate the problems with employees who do not pay dues yet receive 
benefits from the union). 
 85. See Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, Defying Predictions, Union Membership Isn’t 
Dropping Post-Janus, GOVERNING (Dec. 10, 2018, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/workforce/gov-janus-impact-union-membership.html 
[https://perma.cc/L8KN-85BY] (noting that, post-Janus, “most [union members] are staying put” 
and membership has increased for certain unions, such as AFSCME). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. (describing the membership drives unions ran in anticipation of the Janus ruling, 
which unions predicted would be unfavorable). 
 88. See id. (noting how “some Democratically controlled states have recently made it harder 
for public employees to leave unions”). 
 89. Barrett & Greene, supra note 85; Pauline M.K. Young, Union Members May Opt-Out of 
Paying Dues, N.J. LAW. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.newjerseylawyersblog.com/union-
members-may-opt-out-of-paying-dues/ [https://perma.cc/RH4K-2X8J] (discussing New Jersey’s 
Workplace Democracy Act). 
 90. Barrett & Greene, supra note 85; Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, How Much 
Privacy Do Public Employees Actually Have?, GOVERNING (Sept. 24, 2018, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/workforce/gov-government-public-employee-privacy.html 
[https://perma.cc/5ZAE-2QFK] (discussing an executive order signed by Governor Cuomo). 
 91. Barrett & Greene, supra note 85. 
 92. See Bradley D. Marianno, Analysis: From the High Court to the Picket Line—How the 
Janus Case Emboldened Teachers Unions & Made Strikes Key to Their Survival, 74 MILLION (Jan. 
16, 2019), https://www.the74million.org/article/analysis-from-the-high-court-to-the-picket-line-
how-the-janus-case-emboldened-teachers-unions-made-strikes-key-to-their-survival/ 
[https://perma.cc/E6U9-BWMY]; Lydia Saad, Labor Union Approval Steady at 15-Year High, 
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But others view these short-term victories as the last gasp of 
public-sector unions. Conservative groups are rallying to launch a 
campaign to convince workers to stop paying their fair share fees and 
drop their union memberships.93 They predict that union membership 
and fair share fees will fall once employees become informed about their 
right to leave,94 with most of the decline coming from future employees 
never signing up in the first place.95    
As noted above, such declines could lead to reduced assets 
available for unions to engage in shareholder activism and reduced 
capital strategies staffs, as has occurred at SEIU and AFSCME. 
Declining membership and fee payment also have implications for the 
drive to 401(k)s noted earlier. As I document in The Rise of the Working 
Class Shareholder, there is a coordinated campaign to convert these 
public pension funds into 401(k)s that are managed by mutual funds.96 
The Koch brothers, the Arnold Foundation, and others have utilized 
almost every available tool of civil society to bring about this result, 
including state- and citywide ballot initiatives, proposed legislation, 
litigation, and electoral strategies.97 The only cohesive opposition to 
that drive has come from organized labor.98 For example, the Arnold 
Foundation has repeatedly financed statewide ballot initiatives in 
California that would prospectively convert entities like the California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) and the California 
State Teachers’ Retirement System (“CalSTRS”) into defined-
contribution funds.99 The prime mover in opposing such initiatives has 
 
GALLUP (Aug. 30, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/241679/labor-union-approval-steady-year-
high.aspx [https://perma.cc/SR43-KUS2] (noting recent strong support for unions).  
 93. See Barrett & Greene, supra note 85. 
 94. See id. (“[M]embership may also be sustaining or thriving because people aren’t aware of 
the Janus decision or because of actions taken by states to protect unions.”). 
 95. See id. (quoting Ken Girardin of the conservative Empire Center for Public Policy as 
saying, “Based on what we’ve observed, you will likely see a multi-year drop in membership, driven 
chiefly by the fact that people aren’t going to join in the first place”). 
 96. WEBBER, supra note 25, at 213. 
 97. Id. at 212–35. 
 98. See U.S. Congress and Retirement Security, LABORERS’ INT’L UNION N. AM., 
http://www.liuna.org/retirement-security (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ED4J-RBP8] 
(discussing how the Laborers’ International Union of North America “has been pushing for changes 
to the Pension Reform Act that would strengthen pensions and retirement security for working 
Americans”). 
 99. See WEBBER, supra note 25, at 221–23; Allysia Finley, California Pension Fight, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2013, 11:21 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-pension-fight-1381936845 
[https://perma.cc/B9HL-2RPH] (noting that Action Now Initiative, an organization associated with 
The Arnold Foundation, donated $200,000 in a year to support reforms); Action Now Initiative, 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Action_Now_Initiative (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/7F9C-PQDM] (reporting that Action Now Initiative “was active in researching 
and advocating for public pension reform in California”). 
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been the California Teachers Association (“CTA”).100 Not coincidentally, 
the CTA was the defendant in a precursor case to Janus, Friedrichs v. 
California Teachers Association.101 Prior to Janus, the CTA collected 
agency fees.102 Any reduction in those fees, or reduction in unionization 
itself, will necessarily reduce the CTA’s resources, potentially reducing 
both the resources it can bring to defending defined benefit pensions in 
California and the resources it might directly bring to capital strategies. 
The CTA is just one example of a national phenomenon. It has 
now been forced to remarket itself to its own membership. Other unions 
have retained members and dues because of similar efforts to remarket 
themselves to their members.103 These costs are defensive in nature and 
are diverted from efforts to organize new workers or advance a labor 
agenda along other dimensions.104 
III. SCHWAB-THOMAS AND THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS OF  
LABOR’S CAPITAL 
As noted, twenty years ago, Schwab and Thomas brought some 
of the first empiricism to the study of labor’s shareholder activism.105 
The focus of that paper was primarily private-sector union activism, 
although there has always been overlap between public- and private-
sector unions.106 For example, the Service Employees International 
Union and the International Union of Operating Engineers, both of 
which feature in Schwab-Thomas, represent both public- and private-
sector workers.107 Still other unions featured in that paper, like the 
 
 100. The Truth About Teachers’ Retirement, CAL. TCHRS. ASS’N (May 2017), 
https://www.cta.org/en/Issues-and-Action/Retirement.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y8TE-6GFC]. 
 101. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13-676-JLS (CWx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
188995, at 3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013). 
 102. How Teachers Can Opt Out of the California Teachers Association, OPT OUT TODAY, 
https://www.optouttoday.com/california-teachers-association (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/YHR2-SNP7]. 
 103. Rebecca Rainey & Ian Kullgren, 1 Year After Janus, Unions Are Flush, POLITICO (May 
17, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/17/janus-unions-employment-1447266 
[https://perma.cc/AP5W-3HBD] (quoting one union leader as saying, “Janus was seized on by us 
and other parts of the labor movement as an opportunity to re-educate and activate our members 
in a much bigger fight . . . .”). 
 104. See Organizing In A Post-Fair-Share World, CAL. TCHRS. ASS’N, 
https://www.cta.org/leaderresources/Preparing-for-Janus-Decision.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/KP2R-2WTT] (sharing resources for local CTA chapters to promote membership). 
 105. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 21 (discussing private-sector union activism). 
 106. Id. 
 107. About IUOE, INT’L UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS (last visited Nov. 8, 2019), 
https://www.iuoe.org/about-iuoe [https://perma.cc/TN4N-Q62L]; What Type of Work do SEIU 
Members Do?, SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION, https://www.seiu.org/cards/these-fast-facts-will-tell-you-
how-were-organized/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2CD2-UAVE] (“SEIU . . . is the 
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United Food and Commercial Workers (“UFCW”), represent only 
private-sector workers but have often played (then and now) a large role 
in public pension funds. For example, one of the most controversial and 
effective CalPERS Presidents, Sean Harrigan, was a UFCW leader, and 
at least one current board member (Ron Lind) has served as a UFCW 
officer.108  
The Schwab-Thomas paper enables us to see how the challenges 
to labor’s capital have shifted over time. And it helps us to see how 
labor’s success in meeting earlier challenges planted the seeds of the 
challenges they face today. The main challenge Schwab and Thomas 
(accurately) foresaw for labor as shareholder was whether it could 
convince other shareholders that it was acting in their interests too vis-
à-vis corporate management.109 They also showed how labor answered 
that challenge.110 The Schwab-Thomas paper illustrated the 
overwhelming governance focus of labor’s early shareholder activism.111 
Documenting the 1996 and 1997 proxy seasons, the paper identified the 
types of shareholder proposals filed by unions, proposals that would 
sound eerily familiar to ones we observe today.112 They also addressed 
what we today view as bread-and-butter governance concerns. Topics 
included: linking director pay to performance, repealing classified 
boards, redeeming poison pills, requiring directors or director 
candidates to attend annual shareholder meetings, capping executive 
compensation, voting on future golden parachutes, separating board 
chair and CEO, creating a shareholder nominating committee, limiting 
relatives on the board, and prohibiting director conflicts of interest.113 
A small handful of proposals revealed an arguably more “special 
interest” labor focus, resembling topics that have only recently 
reappeared on the national and corporate agendas. For example, the 
Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union proposed that Ashland 
 
largest healthcare union in North America . . . [and] the second largest union of public service 
employees . . . .”). 
 108. Reuters, Calpers Elects Labor Leader as President, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2003), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/21/business/calpers-elects-labor-leader-as-president.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y5R6-CUHW]; CalPERS’ Board Elects Committee Chairs, Vice Chairs, CALPERS 
(Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/newsroom/calpers-news/2017/board-elects-
chairs-vice-chairs [https://perma.cc/U8AJ-FHEQ]. 
 109. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 21, at 1090 (discussing the need for labor unions to 
“adopt a platform of maximizing long-term growth for shareholders and other stakeholders, as well 
as themselves”). 
 110. Id. (“[Unions] are already becoming sophisticated players in corporate-governance 
battles.”). 
 111. Id. (“Labor unions are aggressively using their ownership power to push corporate-
governance reforms.”). 
 112. See id. at 1091–94. 
 113. Id. 
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Company allow an employee on its board.114 The International 
Association of Publishers’ Employees proposed that Dow Jones allow a 
union member on the board.115 These early proposals are echoed today 
in Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposed Accountable Capitalism Act116 
and Senator Tammy Baldwin’s proposed Reward Work Act.117 And in 
an interesting precursor to today’s reporting of the CEO-to-worker pay 
ratio, the Communication Workers of America proposed that Sprint 
“[c]ap executive pay [increases] to employee pay increase[s].”118 One 
proposal, brought by the Amalgamated Bank of New York Longview 
Collective Investment Fund, called for Limited to “[l]ink executive pay 
to overseas labor standards.”119  
This invaluable work serves to demonstrate that past is prologue 
when it comes to labor’s capital. Fringe issues that seemed to attract 
little support are today mainstream, widely debated, and to some extent 
even widely embraced. Moreover, the core challenge Schwab and 
Thomas identified—labor wielding its capital in its own interests while 
balancing those of other shareholders—remains as much a challenge 
today as it was then.120 Today, because of Janus and the systematic 
campaign against defined-benefit pension plans more generally, labor’s 
capital faces a new existential threat.121 It is also more powerful than 
ever, having created a generation of activists that understand how to 
wield shareholder power and have more of it to wield than ever 
before.122 It will be interesting to see, twenty years from now, whether 
labor’s capital will still be able to meet the challenges it has successfully 
coped with over the past two decades. 
 
 114. Id. at 1093. 
 115. Id. at 1091. 
 116. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, Warren Introduces Accountable 
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(Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-releases/reward-work-act-2019 
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 118. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 21, at 1093. 
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 120. See id. at 1052. 
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capital by political advocacy groups like Americans for Prosperity and the Arnold Foundation). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Janus may threaten public 
pension fund and labor fund shareholder activism.123 Those threats are 
both direct and indirect. If Janus’s reasoning were to apply to 
mandatory employee contributions to public pensions, then it could 
require the creation of an opt-out right for public employees.124 True, 
given how attractive these pensions have been as retirement vehicles, 
at least from the perspective of workers and the potentially limited 
number of dissenters, such opt outs might be small in number. But even 
small numbers of opt outs would reduce the capital that pensions can 
bring to bear in the shareholder arena.125 More worrying, opt-out rights 
could create more pressure for pensions to move to 401(k)-style 
retirement funds, which eliminate shareholder voice.126  
The indirect effects of Janus are already making themselves felt. 
To date, these effects have been smaller than feared.127 Still, if the long-
term effect of Janus is to reduce resources for public-sector unions, that 
will in turn reduce resources for the capital strategies divisions of such 
unions and reduce the unions’ ability to defend defined-benefit public 
pension funds from comprehensive and well-funded efforts to convert 
them into 401(k)s.128 In other work, I have argued that collective defined 
contribution funds, effectively collective 401(k)s, could preserve some of 
the shareholder voice that pensions wield now.129 Still, Janus nudges 
the public sector one step closer to the fate that has long since prevailed 
in the private sector, namely, the elimination of traditional pensions in 
favor of 401(k)s.130   
Thus, just over twenty years after Schwab and Thomas first 
documented labor’s growing influence as a shareholder, the future of 
labor’s capital remains uncertain.131 Labor has passed many of the tests 
 
 123. Id. at 239 (“The bigger, more indirect threat to pensions and shareholder activism 
stemming from the loss of collective bargaining [after Janus] is that unions will have fewer 
resources to invest in shareholder activism, or to defend pensions when they are assaulted in 
legislatures or statewide ballot initiatives.”). 
 124. See Finseth, supra note 27, at 293–94. 
 125. See Lin, supra note 19. 
 126. See WEBBER, supra note 25, at 220. 
 127. See Barrett & Greene, supra note 85 (“The court’s decision also led many to predict that 
massive defections of union members would follow. But so far, even as antiunion organizations 
wage campaigns to convince members to drop out, most are staying put. Some unions have actually 
increased their numbers since the Janus verdict.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Webber, supra note 63 (describing campaign to undermine pension funds); see 
also WEBBER, supra note 25, at 212–58 (discussing “the [f]uture of [l]abor’s [c]apital”). 
 129. WEBBER, supra note 25, at 213–21. 
 130. Id. at 220. 
 131. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 21. 
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Schwab and Thomas identified for it decades ago, enhancing its own 
effectiveness as a capital steward by earning the trust of other 
shareholders.132 Today, the challenges of labor’s capital come not from 
other shareholders, but from legal and political threats to its ongoing 
existence.133 Labor may successfully navigate those threats. The 
outcome of this struggle will have profound effects in the world of 
corporate governance and corporate law, given the critical role labor’s 
capital funds have played in this arena in the past two decades.134 
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